Economics & Sociology

ISSN: 2071-789X eISSN: 2306-3459 DOI: 10.14254/2071-789X
Index PUBMS: f5512f57-a601-11e7-8f0e-080027f4daa0
Article information
Title: Missing causality and absent institutionalization. A case of Poland and methodological challenges for future studies of interlocking directorates
Issue: Vol. 11, No 4, 2018
Published date: 12-2018 (print) / 12-2018 (online)
Journal: Economics & Sociology
ISSN: 2071-789X, eISSN: 2306-3459
Authors: Joanna Szalacha-Jarmużek
Institute of Sociology Faculty of Humanities Nicolaus Copernicus University

Krzysztof Pietrowicz
Institute of Sociology Faculty of Humanities, Nicolaus Copernicus University
Keywords: interlocking directorates, social network analysis, economic sociology, mixed-method approach, Poland
DOI: 10.14254/2071-789X.2018/11-4/10
Index PUBMS: a40972c9-18e1-11e9-82eb-fa163e6feac6
Language: English
Pages: 157-172 (16)
JEL classification: Z13
Website: https://www.economics-sociology.eu/?626,en_missing-causality-and-absent-institutionalization.-a-case-of-poland-and-methodological-challenges-for-future-studies-of-interlocking-directorates
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Abstract

The paper has two main aims. The first one is to discuss the dominant method applied in the studies on interlocking directorates. We examine the issue raised by a number of scholars, who point out that the studies carried out in the past 50 years have been solely focused on identifying correlations, while little attention has been paid to the causes and consequences of the phenomenon of interlocking directorates. We argue that the dominant method that shapes contemporary studies on interlocks is overly concentrated on quantitative aspects and fails to distinguish between the executive and supervisory boards. Our second aim is to present the ways in which this state of affairs can be remedied. We suggest a mixed-method approach and present the instrumental case study conducted on 122 largest companies operating in Poland. We argue that humanistic coefficient is missing from the studies on interlocking directorates and demonstrate that a different methodological approach might help to fill this void.

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